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I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause comprises two
sentences. What is the relationship between the first sentence-which
charges that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State"and the second sentence's grant of power to Congress-which states
that "the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
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which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof'?'
In an earlier article I showed that this is an unresolved question,
and offered a solution. 2 I argued, based on text, precedent, and
functionalist considerations, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause's
second sentence-known as the Effects Clause-grants Congress the
primary responsibility to determine the effect one state's laws and
judgments are to have in other states. 3 The courts are free to answer
the question to the extent Congress has not acted. However, such
judicial doctrine has the status of federal common law, and
accordingly can be revised by Congress. Statutes enacted pursuant to
the Effects Clause are judicially reviewable under a deferential
standard, but one that ensures by means of a clear statement rule that
Congress has specifically given attention to which foreign laws and
judgments should be given effect. Finally, if there is no applicable
federal statute or case law, state legislatures are free to come to
coordinated solutions through either uniform laws or interstate
compacts.
I earlier dubbed my theory the "Teamwork" approach 4 insofar as
it contemplates important roles for both Congress and courts in
implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but I think it clearer to
rename this theory the "Congressional Primacy" approach.
This short Article provides an additional important argument on
behalf of congressional primacy. Part I argues that Congress
appropriately plays the primary role in implementing the Full Faith
and Credit Clause because courts' institutional limitations inevitably
lead to either a radical under-enforcement or over-enforcement of the
Clause. This argument is a variation on Larry Sager's critical insight.'
But whereas Sager focused attention on Congress's role in
complementing judicial under-enforcement of constitutional rights,
1. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § I (emphasis added).
2. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors
that Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 957-75
(2006).
3. Id.
4. See id. at 960-61.
5. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
UnderenforcedConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216-20 (1978).
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this Article addresses Congress's essential role in correcting the
courts' tendencies to systematically under-enforce and over-enforce a
structuralconstitutional principle.
Part II applies Part I's insights to the Defense of Marriage Act's
("DOMA") so-called choice of law provision, which provides that
"[n]o State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ... respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State .. "6 I argue that DOMA
does not exceed Congress's Effects Clause powers, even if it provides
full faith and credit rules in respect to judgments that vary from what
Supreme Court case law requires.
Part II also concludes that courts should narrowly construe
DOMA's choice of law provision. It should apply to declaratory
judgments obtained by non-residents who marry in same-sex marriage
states for the purpose of forcing their home states to recognize their
same-sex marriages. But DOMA should not apply to mill-run
judgments in connection with same-sex couples because Congress did
not give any consideration whatsoever to whether such judgments
should be given effect in sister-states when it enacted DOMA.
II. CONGRESS'S POWERS UNDER THE EFFECTS CLAUSE

A. Precedent
The Supreme Court has long understood that the Constitution
grants Congress a significant role in determining what full faith and
credit requires. The 1939 case of Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
IndustrialAccident Commission of California,' for example, presented
the question of whether California could apply its workmen's
compensation statute to an accident in California that involved a
Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts company, or whether the
Full Faith and Credit Clause required the California court to apply the
Massachusetts statute. 8 Before the Court provided an answer, it said:
[I]n the case of [state] statutes, the extra-state effect of which
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
7. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
8. Id. at 497.
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Congress has not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional
provision .... This Court must determine for itself how far the full
faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights
asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute
of another state.9
In other words, the Court explicitly understood that it could determine
what effect full faith and credit demanded California to give to the
Massachusetts statute only because Congress had not decided the
issue pursuant to a federal statute.'o
If Congress unquestionably had the power to statutorily determine
the "extra-state effect" of California's statute before the Court's
decision in Pacific Employers, what happened to Congress's power
after the Court rendered its decision? There are two possibilities:
either the Court's decision displaces such congressional power, or
Congress's power remains.
Precedent suggests-and policy considerations confirm-that
congressional power under the Effects Clause remains intact even
after the Court has laid down a decision. As to precedent, consider the
case of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman," where the Court decided the Full
Faith and Credit Clause did not preclude a forum state from applying
its statute of limitations to all claims in a nationwide class action.1 2
The Court's holding turned on its determination that statutes of
limitations were "procedural" for purposes of full faith and credit. 13
But, continued Justice Scalia for the Court in dictum, "[i]f current
conditions render it desirable that forum States no longer treat a
particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws purposes . .. it can

9. Id. at 502 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
10. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935). Though these cases discussed Congress's powers under the
Effects Clause in relation to state laws, the Court has never suggested that
Congress's powers are any different in respect to state judgments. The arguments
provided in this Article, as well as my previous article, suggest that Congress's
Effects Clause powers vis-A-vis public acts are no different than its powers vis-a-vis
judgments. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 960-84.
11. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
12. Id. at 728-29.
13. Id. at 726-28.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol41/iss1/3

4

Rosen: Congress's Primary Role in Determining What Full Faith and Credit

2010]

CONGRESS'S ROLE IN FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

11I

be proposed that Congress legislate to that effect under the second
sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause."' 4
Sun Oil's dictum explicitly indicates that Congress has the power
to override the Court's full faith and credit decisions. However, the
dictum does not, on its own, wholly answer the scope of congressional
power. After all, it only addresses a congressional effort to augment
the credit due to a sister state's laws regarding what the Court has said
is required; a federal statute providing that statutes of limitations were
"substantive" rather than "procedural" would have meant that the
forum state would have been required to apply the foreign state's
statute of limitations.
As to precedent regarding congressional power to reduce the
credit that a Supreme Court decision declares must be given to another
state's laws or judgments, all we have are equivocal and somewhat
contradictory statements by less than a majority of the Court. Justice
Stone tentatively supported such a power, stating that "[t]he
mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this
Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or
contracted by Congress." 5 But a plurality opinion in 1980
undecidedly pointed in the other direction, stating "there is at least
some question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith
and credit required by a decision of this Court."' 6
B. Policy
There are three strong policy arguments on behalf of the position
that congressional power under the Effects Clause is not displaced by
judicial decisions.
First, to hold otherwise would mean the Constitution created a
race between the courts and Congress in which the institution that acts
first gets to determine what full faith and credit requires. That would
be odd constitutional architecture. Although first-in-time rules to
resolve potential conflicts between institutions with overlapping
powers are not unheard of-consider the rules of res judicata, which
14. Id. at 729 (citation omitted).
15. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
16. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
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provide that the first court that comes to final judgment determines
issues of law and fact' 7-they are unusual. In fact, first-in-time rules
are found only when the two institutions with overlapping powers are
functionally similar.1 8 For example, the courts of States A and B (or of
state court A and federal court C) are functionally similar insofar as all
are courts-such that neither of the competing institutions is clearly
better suited to authoritatively resolve the question. There is no reason
to think a first-in-time rule would make sense vis-A-vis the courts and
Congress in this context.
Second, as I argued at length in my earlier article, Congress is
better institutionally suited than courts to determine what effect one
state's acts and judgments are to have in other states.19 The basic
argument is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause aims to accomplish
two goals that are in tension with one another-fusing the states into a
single nation while keeping the states meaningfully empowered-and
harmonizing such incommensurable goals is an inherently subjective,
political task that is best undertaken by the more politically
accountable branches. 2 0 If Congress does not legislate, and a full faith
and credit question is presented to a court, then the court must provide
some answer. But this judicial answer should not be understood as
displacing the power of the more suitable institution-Congress-to
provide a different answer at a later point. I shall not further elaborate
this argument here.
This Part of the Article provides an additional reason why
Congress is better suited than courts to determine what full faith and
credit requires: past experience shows, and careful consideration of
courts' institutional limitations confirms, that courts will either
radically under-enforce or over-enforce full faith and credit.
Fortunately, the fact that courts have inherent limitations does not
mean that full faith and credit invariably must be ill-implemented (i.e.,
either radically under-enforced or over-enforced). Legislatures have
the very institutional characteristics necessary to intelligently
17. See Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that Justice
Jackson's Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the
Commander-in-Chief 54 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1720-25 (2007).
18. See id.
19. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 967-71.
20. See id.
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implement full faith and credit that courts lack. This is yet another
reason why Congress appropriately has the primary role, via the
Effects Clause, in determining what full faith and credit requires.
1. Three Possible Approaches to Full Faithand Credit
To say Congress appropriately plays the primary role in
determining what full faith and credit requires does not mean courts
are unimportant. To the contrary, here, as elsewhere, courts' probing
analysis in particular cases can tease out the foundational values that
underlie constitutional provisions. Legislatures typically have neither
the time nor inclination to dig so deeply. The courts' heavy lifting can
determine the tradeoffs that must be made among the competing
commitments underlying a constitutional provision. Courts' decisions
thereby present the legislature with a menu of options, among which
the legislature can make its inherently subjective, political choice
when exercising its constitutional powers to legislate. 2 1

21. This interplay between courts and Congress is well illustrated by the
Supreme Court's development of several possible ways of conceptualizing the
relationship of voting dilution to the Fifteenth Amendment, and Congress's selection
of one of these when it enacted the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act. The
Supreme Court held that districting can violate the Fifteenth Amendment if it
"operate[s] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971)
(citation omitted). The Justices divided over whether this was to be determined on
the basis of a subjective or objective test, but ultimately opted for the former, see
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 69-73 (1980), over the dissent of several
Justices who thought a showing of discriminatory impact to be sufficient. See id. at
94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 95 (White, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that invidious purposes can be inferred from "objective
factors"). The plurality opinion also discussed, and quickly rejected, what it
considered to be Justice Marshall's suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment
guaranteed minority groups proportional representation. See id. at 75-80. When
Congress considered what it should do with its powers to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment under section two of that Amendment, it did not proffer its own
independent understanding, but instead chose from among the various conceptions
developed by the Court and the dissenting Justices. Congress rejected the idea that
the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed proportional representation and, most
importantly, adopted a discriminatory impact standard instead of a subjective
discriminatory purpose standard. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN &
RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:

LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE

POLITICAL PROCESS 569-91 (3rd ed. 2007) (collecting legislative history).
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Much indeed can be learned from the Supreme Court's full faith
and credit jurisprudence. But before seeing this, it is first necessary to
provide some background. Determining the credit one state must give
to a public act or judgment from another state, and deciding whether
the forum must give effect to the foreign state's law or judgment or
whether the forum state can instead apply its own law (or generate its
own judgments), constitutes a choice of law question. Scholars
usefully distinguish between two different approaches that can be
taken to choice of law: the unilateralist approach and the
multilateralist approach.2 2 The unilateralist approach resolves the
question by looking to considerations that relate to only one state. 23 A
multilateralist approach, by contrast, considers factors in relation to
each of the states whose laws or judgments are potentially
applicable. 24
With the distinction between unilateralism and multilateralism in
mind, we can now proceed to the case law. In the 1930s, the Supreme
Court recognized that determining what credit a forum state had to
give to another state's law could be resolved by flatly requiring the
forum state to apply the foreign state's law. 25 Indeed, this is arguably
the most straightforward reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
which states "Full Faith and Credit shall be given" to the statutes and
judgments "of every other State." 26 Flatly requiring application of
foreign law is a unilateralist approach insofar as it decides what law is
applicable by focusing analysis on only one state-the foreign state.
Let's call this "foreign-state unilateralism."
The Court immediately rejected this unilateralist approach, stating
that "[a] rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit
clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the
absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state
must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its
22. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,39 HARv. INT'L L.J. 101, 107-10
(1998); Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 78485 (2008).
23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See sources cited supra note 22.
25. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indust. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S.
532, 547 (1935).
26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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own."27 As the italicized language indicates, the Court believed that
determining full faith and credit's requirements necessitated taking
into account not only the foreign state's statute, but also the "statute of
the forum."2 8 In other words, the Court rejected a unilateralist
approach in favor of a multilateralist approach.
The Court implemented multilateralism by fashioning a balancing
test that took account of both states' interests. In the words of the
Court, the "conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to
the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to
subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising
the governmental interests of each jurisdiction,and turning the scale
of decision accordingto their weight."29 Under this balancing test, the
Court frequently held that the forum state's interest justified
application of forum rather than foreign law,30 but also required the
forum to apply foreign law when the foreign state's interests
outweighed those of the forum.3 1
In the 1980s the Court shifted course. Over a series of cases, the
Court abandoned the balancing test. In its place the Court adopted a
test permitting the forum state to apply forum law so long as the
forum state had a "significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or
transaction. "32 This new test (popularly referred to as the Hague test)
is a unilateralist approach; full faith and credit's requirements are
ascertained by focusing on only one state. But in contrast to the
foreign-state unilateralism that the Court quickly rejected in the 1930s,
the Hague test focuses exclusively on the forum state. Full faith and
27. Alaska PackersAss 'n, 294 U.S. at 547 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the
Court has adopted, and retained, a nearly automatic approach of foreign-state
unilateralism in respect to judgments of sister-state courts. See infra note 34; see
also Rosen, supra note 2, at 945-51 (discussing this case law along with a small set
of exceptions). Whether full faith and credit's application should vary so
dramatically as between laws and judgments is a long-discussed question in
conflicts-of-law scholarship that lies beyond the scope of this brief essay.
28. Alaska PackersAss'n, 294 U.S. at 547.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., id. at 548-50; see also Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939).
31. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 155-62 (1932),
overruled in part by Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
32. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion).
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credit is satisfied under Hague so long as the forum state has some
minimal contacts with the parties, transaction, or occurrence. 33 No
attention need be given to the foreign state's interests. Let us call the
Hague test an instance of "forum-state unilateralism."
In short, judicial experience has identified three possible
approaches to determining what full faith and credit to laws requires:
(1) looking exclusively to the foreign state (foreign-state
unilateralism), (2) looking to the interests of all potentially interested
states (multilateralism), and (3) looking exclusively to the forum state
(forum-state unilateralism). The Supreme Court quickly rejected the
first (foreign-state unilateralism) in favor of the second
(multilateralism), and then rejected the second (multilateralism) for
the third (forum-state unilateralism). A similar story is found in the
context of the case law that concerns full faith and credit to
judgments: an early embrace of multilateralism ultimately gave way to
unilateralism, albeit the foreign-state variety rather than Hague's
forum-state variety.34
33. Id. In Hague itself, and in subsequent cases, Hague's minimum contacts
test has amounted to an easily satisfied standard. See Katherine Florey, State Courts,
State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the ExtraterritorialityPrinciple in
Choice ofLaw and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1057, 1058-59 (2009). For
an unusual circumstance where Hague's minimum contacts requirement was not
met, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822-23 (1985).
34. Contemporary jurisprudence adopts a nearly ironclad requirement that the
forum state give effect to a sister-state's judgment, even if doing so is deeply
contrary to the forum state's interests. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 233 (1998); Rosen, supra note 2, at 945. In contrast to this foreign-state
unilateralism, the Court's early full faith and credit case law recognized many
circumstances where the forum state did not have to give effect to a sister-state
judgment. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 216-24 (1933) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting) (citing many cases where multilateralist analysis led to the
conclusion that a foreign judgment need not be given effect). The case of
Yarborough provided a good example of a circumstance where giving effect to a
foreign state's judgment had significant in-state consequences. Georgia had issued a
decree that fixed a father's support and maintenance obligations for his minor child.
Id. at 204. After the decree's issuance the child relocated to South Carolina where
South Carolina law permitted support and maintenance decrees to be reopened upon
changing circumstances, but Georgia's law did not. See id. at 220-23 (Stone, C.J.,
dissenting). Applying a multilateralist approach, Chief Justice Stone cited to
precedent for the proposition that "full faith and credit does not command that the
obligations attached to a status, because once appropriately imposed by one state,
shall be forever placed beyond the control of every other state, without regard to the
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2. JudicialIncapacity andLegislative Prowess
What explains this trajectory of changing judicial approaches to
determining what full faith and credit requires? We need not guess
because the Court has told us.3 5 The Court immediately rejected
foreign-state unilateralism because it is nonsensical-why should the
forum state automatically, and always, be required to apply the foreign
state's statute? By contrast, multilateralism is sensible because it
sought to accommodate the competing interests of each state that are
invariably present when full faith and credit is at issue. In other words,
foreign-state unilateralism was a problematically simplified analysis
that ignored considerations that could not be overlooked if a just
outcome were to be obtained.
But if multilateralism is conceptually attractive, why did the Court
reject it in the 1980s? With unusual candor, the Court has
acknowledged it was incapable of implementing a multilateralist
methodology:
We have, in the past, appraised and balanced state interests when
invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause to resolve conflicts
between overlapping laws of coordinate States. This balancing
approach quickly proved unsatisfactory. As Justice Robert H.
Jackson ... aptly observed, 'it [is] difficult to point to any field in
which the Court has more completely demonstrated or more
candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal
character than in trying to determine what choice of law is required
by the Constitution.' In light of this experience, we abandoned the
balancing-of-interests approach under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.36

interest in it and the power of control which the other may later acquire." Id. at 219
(citation omitted). Believing that "[t]he maintenance and support of children
domiciled within a state, like their education and custody, is a subject in which
government itself is deemed to have a peculiar interest and concern." Id. at 220. The
Chief Justice concluded the Georgia judgment could not displace South Carolina's
power to reevaluate the father's obligations. Id. at 221-22. The majority, by contrast,
employed a unilateralist approach that focused exclusively on the fact that Georgia
had issued a final judgment. See id. at 212.
35. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
36. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495-96 (2003) (citations
omitted).
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Notably, the Court did not suggest multilateralism was
conceptually wrongheaded. How could it? Multilateralism is the only
sensible approach: foreign-state unilateralism over-enforces full faith
and credit at the cost of the forum state, whereas forum-state
unilateralism under-enforces full faith and credit at the cost of the
foreign state. The problem was that the Court could not successfully
implement multilateralism. 37
a. JudicialDeficiencies
The Court correctly concluded that courts are ill-suited to
implement a multilateralist approach to full faith and credit.
Multilateralism involves three steps: ascertaining the purposes behind
each state's law, determining the intensity of each state's interest in
their respective laws, and balancing the interests of one state in
applying its law against the other state's interest in having its law
applied. All three steps are fraught with difficulties for courts.

37. The Court has not so forthrightly explained its embrace of unilateralism in
respect to sister-state judgments. See sources cited supra note 34. The analysis that
follows in the text shows that the same institutional deficiencies that make it
difficult for courts to implement multilateralism vis-A-vis sister-state laws are fully
operative in the context of sister-state judgments. See infra pp. 22-26 (contrasting
judicial and legislative approaches to child support orders).
38. The reasoning process under multilateralism is similar to the "comparative
impairment" analysis found in the non-constitutional choice of law context, under
which courts facing a "true conflict" are to apply the law of the state whose policies
would be more greatly impaired if it was not applied. See Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723-26 (Cal. 1976) (providing an example). Scholars have
helpfully canvassed the difficulties faced by courts in implementing comparative
impairment, and the discussion above in the text draws on these insights. See
William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of
Conflict of Laws: Baxter's ComparativeImpairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1011, 1027-40 (1999); Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law:
Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 255, 268 (1978); Herma
Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the CaliforniaExperience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 576, 604-17 (1980); Larry
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 316-18 (1990). For a
critical discussion of these critiques of comparative impairment see Mark D. Rosen,
Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MiNN. L. REv. 783,
818-21 (2004).
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The first step, determining the purpose behind a state law, is
infamously thorny.3 9 To begin, full faith and credit concerns the
choice between or among the laws of different states; it is trickier to
ascertain the legislative purpose behind state laws than federal laws
because states typically produce no formal legislative histories or
published debates. Moreover (and moving to generic challenges in
identifying legislative purpose), because individual legislators
typically have different motivations, whose counts? Even if one were
to abandon the search for the legislature's subjective intent,
difficulties remain because there are typically many different objective
purposes that plausibly can be ascribed to a given law. 4 o Determining
purpose is further complicated because full faith and credit concerns
cross-border contexts involving out-of-state parties, transactions, or
occurrences. States could quite plausibly choose to treat a purely
domestic matter one way and an inter-state matter differently,4 1 yet
legislators virtually never consider how their laws should apply to
inter-state matters. This means that even in the relatively rare case
where a state legislature has explicitly indicated the purpose behind a
given law, one cannot assume the purpose regarding domestic matters
applies to the cross-border context.
The second step, determining the intensity of a state's interest in a
particular law, is even more difficult than the first step. Indeed, it is
not clear how one would even measure the intensity of a state's
interest in its policy.
The third step, balancing the states' competing interests, creates
incommensurability problems because the states' different policies
can almost never be translated into a common metric that permits a
determinate balancing. Moreover, even if the policies are somehow
commensurable, what is one to do if each state values each of the
policies differently? For these reasons, though courts and
39. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 88-95 (1991) (providing a useful overview).

40. For a particularly trenchant demonstration of this and a discussion of
concepts of depecage and bundling, which help explain some non-obvious
challenges in correctly ascertaining legislative purpose, see Allen & O'Hara,supra
note 38, at 1034-39.
41. This is one of the essential insights of Brainerd Currie's interest analysis
approach. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-ofLaws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 237 (1958).
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commentators typically use the metaphor of "balancing," a more apt
term is "choosing." And a choice between incommensurable policies
or between commensurable policies that are valued differently by the
states is invariably a deeply subjective decision. 42
The difficulties with each of these three steps are well illustrated
by considering the facts of an old classic of the choice of law course,
Lilenthal v. Kaufinan.43 An Oregon law sought to protect spendthrifts
(financially irresponsible persons) and their families by stripping the

capacity to contract from administratively declared spendthrifts.44 An
Oregon citizen who had been declared a spendthrift entered into a
contract with a Californian merchant in California, and California had
no such spendthrift law. 45 Should the contract be enforced in
accordance with California law, or was it voidable per Oregon's law?
To begin, there are difficulties in determining the purpose behind
the laws of each state. Oregon's interests in paternalistically protecting
the spendthrift and guarding the third-party interests of the
spendthrift's family are clear. But did Oregon intend its law to apply
only to domestic contracts with Oregon merchants, who can be
presumed to be familiar with Oregon law, or also to inter-state
transactions with out-of-state merchants about whom the same cannot
be assumed? As to California: did the absence of a spendthrift law
indicate that it valued the security of contracts more than paternalistic
and third-party interests, or had California simply never considered
the matter of spendthrifts?
Even if it is assumed that California had considered the issue of
spendthrifts, but valued security of contracts more, how are the two
states' interests to be balanced? Security of contracts cannot be
mechanically balanced against paternalism and the guarding of thirdparties' interests; comparing these competing interests is like trying to
compare "apples and oranges," which are incapable of being
translated into a common measuring unit that would permit an
objective balancing whose outcome all rational actors could agree
42. See generally Rosen, supra note 38, at 820-22.
43. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). The facts in Lilenthal usefully illustrate the
difficulties inherent in balancing enumerated above, however, it is important to note
the Lilenthal court did not itself utilize either a balancing of interests or comparative
impairment approach.
44. Id. at 544.
45. Id.
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upon. Further, how is the Oregon court supposed to balance the two
states' interests when each state values the interests differently? After
all, Oregon also values security of contracts, but simply believes that
this interest is of less value than is the protection of the spendthrift and
his or her family.
b. Legislatures' ComparativeAdvantages
Fortunately, the lack of judicial success with multilateralism need
not condemn the American legal system to either under-enforcing full
faith and credit with forum-state unilateralism or over-enforcing full
faith and credit by means of foreign-state unilateralism. This is
because there are non-judicial governmental institutions that are far
better suited than courts to implement multilateralist solutions:
legislatures. More specifically, Congress can legislate, or the state
legislatures can act together to create uniform laws or state compacts.
As to the threshold question of whether these legislative bodies
have the power to create such solutions, the answer is an
uncomplicated yes. Congress is authorized under the Effects Clause,
and in the absence of federal law the states themselves have the power
to enact uniform laws or enter into compacts that determine the
extraterritorial effect that one state's law has in another state. 46
Both these legislative bodies have significant institutional
advantages over the courts in implementing multilateralism. First,
legislatures are better situated than courts at eliciting the purpose
behind state laws. Clearly a state legislature is the best institution to
determine the purpose behind its own state's law, but Congress also
has advantages over the courts. If Congress addressed the question of
which state's law was to have extraterritorial effect, then the
legislators from the affected states would have a greater incentive to
determine, and take seriously, their home state's law than would a
single state court judge who were hearing a single case. After all, state

46. See generally Mark D. Rosen, State ExtraterritorialPowers Reconsidered,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1149-53 (2010). Some inter-state compacts of course
require congressional approval. For two excellent discussions of interstate compacts,
see Allan Erbsen, HorizontalFederalism,93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 534-37 (2008); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency,49 FLA. L. REv. 1, 1-11 (1997).
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court judges are notoriously overworked and underwhelmed about
undertaking serious research into another jurisdiction's law.
Further, legislatures are better structured than courts to undertake
the decision making process that informs intelligent multilateralist
solutions. Legislatures permit all interested parties to participate in
generating a solution. Congress, after all, is composed of
representatives from every state. Likewise, a uniform law or state
compact would be the product of a decision-making process in which
all affected states could participate. By contrast, full faith and credit
determinations issued in the course of litigation are made unilaterally
by the court of a single state. Allowing the participation of all affected
parties is preferable on basic democratic grounds and likely has
epistemic benefits as well.47
Furthermore, legislatures permit inter-state coordinated solutions
that are outside courts' power and competency. There are several
reasons why legislatures are better than courts at solving collective
action problems. First, legislatures produce rules that bind all parties
prospectively. By contrast, a court aiming to "balance interests" in a
particular case has less incentive to set aside its own state's interests in
the case-at-hand because there is no guarantee, or even reason to
expect, that the other state will show similar solicitude sometime later
if and when it hears a similar case.4 8 Second, legislatures can address
multiple issues simultaneously, facilitating bargaining and
compromise. Third, legislatures can create new institutions to
facilitate implementation of coordinated solutions.
Finally, legislatures are places where competing policy
commitments are reconciled all the time by means of harmonization,
compromise, deal-cutting, and log-rolling. 49 Such deal-making is
expected to occur in legislatures, and it is facilitated by the structure of
the legislative decision making process where repeat players interact
on multiple issues over time. In the course of these legislative

47. See DAvID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AuTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 98-116 (2008) (providing a general discussion concerning the
epistemic advantages of democratic decision making procedures).
48. The rules of stare decisis and precedent, which guarantee a degree of
common-law prospectivity, do not apply to a sister-state's rulings.
49. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct
Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 687, 697-704 (2010).
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processes, legislators are forced to consider how intensely they value
various matters.
These legislative features explain why the legislative process
better tracks the decision making process at the heart of
multilateralism than does the decision making process implemented
by courts. To state the matter at one higher level of abstraction,
selecting among incommensurable commitments, or among
commensurable commitments that states value differently, is an
inherently subjective process that is a paradigmatically political
choice.5 o As explained above, legislatures are better structured than
courts to make such political choices. And legislatures are better
suited on foundational democratic grounds to make such choices.
Legislatures' institutional advantages vis-A-vis courts are well
illustrated by considering the following question: does full faith and
credit forbid the courts of State B from modifying a spousal support
order that courts from State A issued? Justice Traynor, a highly
esteemed justice of the California Supreme Court who many widely
and rightly lauded as an expert in conflicts-of-law, confronted this
question in Worthley v. Worthley.5 1 More specifically, at issue in
Worthley was whether California courts had the power to modify a
New Jersey spousal support decree. 52 Though the New Jersey court
unquestionably had had the power to issue the spousal support
decree-the couple had been married and had resided in New Jersey
until they separated, and both wife and husband had participated in the
New Jersey proceeding-the husband had since moved to
California.5 3 Justice Traynor concluded that California courts could
modify the New Jersey court's maintenance decree.5 4
Justice Traynor's approach was subsequently rejected by the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"),ss which has been
50. See Rosen, supra note 38, at 820-22.
51. 283 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1955).
52. Id. at 21-22.
53. Id. at 21. The dissenting opinion observed that "[t]here is nothing in the
record to show that [the wife] is not still residing in New Jersey." Id. at 26 (Spence,
J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 25.
55. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 211 (2008). The states were
able to act via uniform law because there was no federal law, either statute or case
law, that constrained them. As Justice Traynor's opinion for the Worthley Court

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

17

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 3

24

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 56 Whereas
Justice Traynor authorized the non-issuing state (California) to modify
the maintenance order, UIFSA provides that a state that had
jurisdiction when it entered a spousal support order has "continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support order throughout
the existence of the support obligation." 57
Much can be learned by contrasting Worthley with UIFSA. Why,
one might ask, did they take such different approaches? Much is
probably attributable to the fact the two approaches emerged from
different institutions: courts versus legislatures. 8 Whereas Justice
Traynor could only decide the question regarding California, the entity
that drafted UIFSA was seeking a uniform rule that would
prospectively bind all states. When faced with the possibility of a
coordinated approach, states were willing to cede some power (by
limiting the scope of their courts' powers to modify spousal-support
orders issued by other states) in order to enhance the durability and
predictability of the spousal-support orders their courts would issue.
The legislative context permitted coordination in yet another
crucial dimension. In the legislative context, the parties were able to
simultaneously address multiple related issues: spousal-support orders
issued from other states, spousal-support orders from their own states,
and child custody orders. 59 This coordinated action regarding multiple

correctly indicated, the federal case law neither required nor prohibited the courts of
State A from modifying a non-final order that had been issued by the courts of State
B. See Worthley, 283 P.2d at 21-22.
56. See DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT
ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 525 (8th ed.

2010).
57. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT

§ 211 (2008) (emphasis

supplied).
58. To be sure, the drafters of UIFSA had the benefit of hindsight, not
available to Justice Traynor, insofar as they had an opportunity to see the problems
that Worthley's approach generated in practice. However, this does not wholly
explain the differences because the major shortcoming of Worthley's solution was
anticipated in Justice Spence's dissenting opinion in Worthley. See Worthley, 283
P.2d at 26 (Spence, J., dissenting) ("This will result in confusion worse confounded,
as the courts of each of several states, including New Jersey, might be called upon to
modify the same decree, both retroactively as well as prospectively.").
59. UIFSA provides different rules for spousal-support orders and childsupport orders. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
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issues facilitated compromise because states could give a bit regarding
one issue to gain in another. Trade-offs are more difficult when issues
are addressed in a piecemeal fashion, as generally occurs in courts.
Moreover, legislatures, but not the courts of a single state, can
create new institutions that can facilitate prospective inter-state
coordination. One of Justice Traynor's strongest arguments was that
allowing only the issuing state to modify spousal-support orders
would result in an unworkable situation in which
[r]epeated suits for arrearages would have to be brought in New
Jersey as installments accrued, to be followed by repeated actions
in California to enforce the New Jersey judgments for accrued
installments, with the net result that the costs of litigation and the
dilatoriness of the recovery would substantially reduce the value of
the support to which plaintiff is entitled.60
The drafters of UIFSA were able to sidestep this problem by creating
a registration system in which properly registered orders are promptly
enforced in sister state courts.6 1
There is a final way in which legislatures are superior to courts for
solving the type of issues that arise in relation to full faith and credit.
Whether spousal support orders should be modifiable only by the
issuing state, or also by a new state of residence, invariably involves
trade-offs among incommensurable considerations. The former entails
costs to the new resident, who is forced to re-litigate in his or her
previous state. The latter imposes costs to the spouse who has not
adopted a new state of residence, and also may be said to show
"disrespect" to the judgment of the original issuing state. Selecting
between these options involves a choice among incommensurable
considerations that invariably is subjective and accordingly is more
suitable to legislatures than courts.
3. Congress Versus State Legislatures
While Congress and the state legislatures share many institutional
advantages over the courts in determining what full faith and credit
60. Worthley, 283 P.2d at 25.
61. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
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requires, Congress and the state legislatures are not equivalently
situated. In fact, Congress has two significant institutional advantages
in respect to the state legislatures. First, Congress is better situated to
guard the national interests that are at stake. After all, Congress is a
national institution that is charged with looking out for national
interests, whereas state legislatures primarily aim to secure the
interests of their own states. Further, national legislation involves the
participation of the President, our country's only nation-wide elected
official.6 2 Because Congress also is expected to look out for the states'
interests insofar as representatives and senators are elected by statebased constituencies,6 3 there is reason to believe Congress is more
likely than state legislatures to take account of all the interests that
appropriately inform the determination of what full faith and credit
requires. On the other hand, state parochialism may be mitigated by
uniform laws, which are at least partially drafted by experts, including
academics, who generally do not lose sight of national interests. 64
Moreover, national interests are unlikely to be wholly forgotten in
respect to state compacts that require congressional approval, though
national interests may be more fully protected by congressional
statutes. 65
Congress's second institutional benefit over the state legislatures
is that Congress can far more readily enact nation wide solutions. It
takes a majority of Congress, or two-thirds should the President

62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-53 (1985) (discussing the "procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system" by which Congress protects the
interests of states).
64. See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Modeling the Uniform Law
"Process": A Comment on Scott's Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1081
(2002) (discussing the role of various expert organizations, including the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, in the drafting of uniform laws).
65. While the requirement of congressional approval may encourage states to
give some consideration to national interests, such interests may feature more
prominently in the minds of Congress if it were to take the first crack at crafting a
full faith and credit solution. Faced with a proposed compact that did not give as
much consideration to national interests as it would prefer, Congress may be
unwilling to withhold its approval on account of the compact's promised benefits.
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exercise his veto power, to enact a statute. 66 To obtain a nation-wide
solution via the state legislatures, by contrast, requires unanimous
state support, for each state legislature must enact the uniform law or
agree to an interstate compact. 67 There are well-known drawbacks to
unanimity rules: they give hold-outs excessive power, and they more
generally under-provide socially useful legislation. 6 8 Furthermore,
even if all states enact a uniform law, the state legislatures frequently
make changes to the model uniform law's language, thereby creating
non-uniformities across states. 69 Interstate differences typically grow
over time as the courts of each state interpret its state's enacted
uniform law. A single federal statute, by contrast, would be applicable
across every state, and all courts would interpret that single statute
rather than one of fifty different state statutes. And, of course, the
Supreme Court can provide uniform, nationwide interpretations of
federal legislation, but not of the fifty states' different uniform laws.
For all these reasons, any solution that comes via state legislatures
is far less likely to be nationwide in scope than a federal statute. The
extent to which interstate differences undermine the collective benefits
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
67. It would likely be more difficult to solve nationwide full faith and credit
problems via interstate compacts than uniform laws. Collective action problems are
reduced in the uniform laws context by the custom that has arisen; the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafts a single proposed text in consultation
with the states and relevant interest groups, and then proposes the text to the states to
vote on. See generally Mooney, supra note 64. The interstate compact process is not
so formalized because each state tends to establish a special commission, who then
work together. See generally Hasday, supra note 46, at 18-22. For this reason,
interstate compacts tend to involve only two or a handful of states, not all states. The
main benefit to interstate compacts compared to uniform laws is their permanence.
As Professor Hasday helpfully explains,
[a] state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke, or amend one of its compacts
if the compact does not so provide, and the extent to which a compact may
constitutionally permit any alteration by less than unanimous consent is
unclear. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a state may not withdraw
from a compact on the ground that its highest court has found the
agreement to be contrary to the state constitution.
Hasday, supra note 46, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
68. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 50-52 (1989); AMARTYA K.
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 24-27 (1970).
69. See, e.g., UNW. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 404 (2001) (listing variations from
official text under Maine law).
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of a legislative solution depends on context-specific considerations.
Common sense suggests that in some circumstances the presence of
even one outlier state can potentially lead to strategic behavior by
individuals that may significantly undermine the value of the
coordinated solution, whereas other times the costs may be more
limited.
C. A BriefSummary
The Court has identified three different approaches that can be
taken to full faith and credit: foreign-state unilateralism, forum-state
unilateralism, and multilateralism. The two forms of unilateralism
oversimplify full faith and credit, leading to severe over-enforcement
(with foreign-state unilateralism) or under-enforcement (with forumstate unilateralism). Multilateralism is the most sensible approach, but
successfully implementing it stretches courts beyond their institutional
capabilities. This is why the Court has retreated from multilateralism
to unilateralism.
Fortunately, legislatures are well suited to implement
multilateralism. Congress has the power to enact multilateral solutions
pursuant to the Effects Clause, and is free to act even if the Court
already decided what full faith and credit requires. For this reason,
judicial opinions have the status of federal common law that are
subject to congressional revision. In the absence of federal solutions,
state legislatures are free to fashion coordinated solutions in the form
of uniform laws or interstate compacts, as they have in fact done.
II. THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

Part I's analysis has important implications for the Defense of
Marriage Act. If Congress's Effects Clause powers are undiminished
by the Court's full faith and credit case law, which is appropriately
treated as federal common law rather than as a final determination of
what the Full Faith and Credit Clause constitutionally requires, then
DOMA's choice of law provision is a legitimate exercise of Congress'
effects clause powers. This conclusion holds even if DOMA changes
the Court's previously developed full faith and credit rules.
But it is necessary to be clear about precisely what are and are not
Part I's implications regarding DOMA. First, Part I does not have any
implications in respect to DOMA's rules regarding law because
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DOMA does not alter the Court's rules as to what full faith and credit
requires of laws. As discussed above, the Hague rule imposes
virtually no obligation on the courts of one state to apply the laws of
another state. 70 DOMA essentially restates this non-requirement,
providing that "[n]o State. . . shall be required to give effect to any
public act . .. respecting a relationship between persons of the same

sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State." 7 1
Hence, Part I's argument has no application to this part of DOMA.
Second, DOMA's choice of law provision does have real bite in
respect to judgments from sister state courts. Longstanding case law
has established a nearly ironclad requirement that State B give
automatic effect to the judgment from State A, even if doing so is
deeply contrary to State B's public policy. 72 In light of this case law, it
plausibly can be claimed that DOMA seeks to change the Supreme
Court's full faith and credit requirements73 in providing that "[n]o
State ... shall be required to give effect to any . .. judicialproceeding
of any other State . .. respecting a relationship between persons of the

same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State." 74 Many respected scholars have argued DOMA is
unconstitutional on the ground it alters what the Court said full faith
and credit requires as to judgments.7 5 These scholars' arguments are
mistaken if Part I's analysis is correct. 76
But this is not the end of the story regarding DOMA's
constitutionality because two crucial caveats remain. First, to say
DOMA does not exceed Congress's powers under the Effects Clause
70. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
72. For a discussion of this case law, see Rosen, supra note 2, at 945-5 1.
73. Elsewhere I have disputed the proposition that DOMA's rule regarding the
types of judgments that its drafters sought to address altered applicable full faith and
credit case law. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 945-5 1. The argument in the above text
is fully independent of my previous argument-an argument that, I should be clear, I
still believe to be valid.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (emphasis added).
75. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 932-57, 984-85 (reviewing arguments to this
effect by Dean Larry Kramer and Professors Lawrence Tribe, Andrew Koppelman,
Emily Sack, and Stanley Cox).
76. Elsewhere I have provided an explanation and critique of each of these
scholars' arguments that is different from, but consistent with, the argument
provided here. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 932-57.
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is not the same thing as saying DOMA is constitutional. DOMA
conceivably could run afoul of other constitutional provisions. It may,
for example, violate the liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause or it may violate the Equal Protection Clause.77
The second critical stipulation concerns statutory interpretation:
how broadly should DOMA's language-"[n]o State ... shall be
required to give effect to any ... judicial proceeding of any other
State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treatedas a marriageunder the laws ofsuch other State"78-be
construed? Though I fully acknowledge that DOMA's language is
unqualified, I shall argue here that it nevertheless should be narrowly
interpreted to apply to only a narrow category of judgments.79
Some background is necessary to understand precisely what
judgments DOMA addresses. Congress enacted DOMA when it
appeared Hawaii was to become the first state to allow gay couples to
marry.s0 It was widely understood that the Court's full faith and credit
jurisprudence would not have required other states to recognize
Hawaii's gay marriages, 8 1 and for that reason some gay rights
advocates came up with an ingenuous stratagem to maximize the
scope of Hawaii's anticipated ruling. The activists suggested that gay
couples who did not live in Hawaii could travel to Hawaii, marry, and
then obtain a declaratory judgment from a Hawaii court that made
reference to their married status. 82 Gay activists hoped this would
require the couple's home state to recognize the Hawaii marriage on
account of the strictness of the full faith and credit jurisprudence
regarding judgments. 83

77. See Rosen, supranote 2, at 928-3 1, 1001.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (emphasis added).
79. Several courts have in fact done so. See, e.g., Giancaspro v. Congleton,
No. 283267, 2009 WL 416301, at * 2 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (per curiam);
Prashad v. Copeland, 685 S.E.2d 199, 206 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). For a helpful
discussion of these cases, see Rhonda Wasserman, DOMA and the Happy Family: A
Lesson in Irony, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 275, 299-302 (2010).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2-10 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906-14.
81. See Rosen, supranote 2, at 948-50.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 948.
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This "travel marriage" stratagem was designed to circumvent the
ordinary American rule, under which the state of residence has
virtually exclusive regulatory power over family law matters.8 4 The
legislative history, as seen in both the House Report on DOMA as
well as the congressional debates, unquestionably reveals that the only
types of judgments Congress considered when it enacted DOMA were
declaratory judgments intended to fortify such travel marriages. 8 5
DOMA's choice of law provision should be construed as applying
only to judgments obtained to secure these travel marriages, for two
reasons. First, DOMA should be narrowly construed pursuant to the
interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance. 8 6 Professor Andrew
Koppelman has demonstrated that applying DOMA's unqualified
language to cover all judgments that affect married gays would result
in flatly absurd outcomes.8 7 Koppelman relies on such absurdities to
conclude that DOMA is irrational and accordingly unconstitutional
under the lowest level of scrutiny demanded by the equal protection
doctrine. But there is a sensible alternative: courts could narrowly
construe DOMA's judgments provision in accordance with the canon
of statutory interpretation that "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." 89
However, the canon of constitutional avoidance, on its own,
would not be sufficient to support the narrow interpretation of DOMA
advocated here. Though it is true that the narrow interpretation does
not run afoul of Congress's intent (because, as discussed above,
Congress did not consider DOMA's application to garden-variety
judgments, but was instead exclusively concerned with declaratory
84. See id. at 949.
85. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2-10 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906-14; see also Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why
the Defense ofMarriageAct is Unconstitutional,83 IOWA L. REv. 1, 17 (1997).
86. For a critical discussion of constitutional avoidance and related doctrines,
see Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions,85 GEO. L.J. 1948-49 (1997).
87. See Koppelman, supra note 85, at 17. For a critical discussion of some of
Professor Koppelman's examples, see Rosen, supra note 2, at 979-8 1.
88. See Koppelman, supra note 85, at 17.
89. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
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judgments connected to travel marriages) the interpretation of DOMA
I propose would constitute an aggressive use of the avoidance canon
on account of DOMA's unqualified language. Though the Supreme
Court has occasionally relied on similarly aggressive uses of this
canon, 90 courts may be understandably reluctant to rely on it alone.
Further, even if courts did invoke the canon, it would not support
the (very) narrow interpretation I advocate. After all, the canon of
constitutional avoidance only counsels against potentially
unconstitutional interpretations of a statute, and it is unlikely that
DOMA's application to all judgments (apart from declaratory
judgments in connection with travel marriages) would be flatly absurd
and hence potentially unconstitutional. Accordingly, while the
constitutional avoidance canon suggests that DOMA should not be
understood as applying to all judgments notwithstanding its
unqualified language, the canon does not support the narrow
interpretation of DOMA that I am proposing.
Fortunately, there is a second reason for narrowly construing
DOMA's choice of law provision that is wholly independent of the
canon of constitutional avoidance. This second reason is tied to the
argument made in Part I of this article. Part I explained that
Congress's full faith and credit determinations, pursuant to the Effects
Clause, properly have priority over the Court's jurisprudence due to
the numerous institutional advantages Congress enjoys over courts in
determining what full faith and credit requires. But Congress's
institutional advantages are activated and operative only if and when
Congress has actually considered a full faith and credit issue
previously decided by the Court. If Congress has not, then there is no
reason for the Court's careful judgment to be displaced. Indeed,
displacing the Court's considered judgment with a congressional nonjudgment would be perverse. To put it another way, although the
Court's full faith and credit pronouncements are not the last word on
the subject, the proper respect owed to the Court requires that the
Court's full faith and credit determinations not be displaced unless
Congress has specifically reconsidered the Court's determination, as
shown either by explicit statutory language or legislative history.

90. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504, 2513-17 (2009).
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The interpretive principle that gives rise to this second reason for
construing DOMA narrowly is not unprecedented. Clear statement
rules likewise aim to ensure Congress has given specific consideration
to a matter. 91 To be clear, I do not advocate an interpretive principle
that purports to gauge whether Congress gave adequate consideration
because, among other reasons, courts likely could not develop
principled tests to determine how much legislative consideration is
sufficient. Instead, the judicially implemented interpretive principle
that I advocate would operate in a binary fashion, making the statute
applicable only in respect to judgments that were given some
consideration by the legislature. Several doctrines operate in a similar
binary manner, eschewing judgments of degree and calling for judicial
action only where there is a complete absence of some factor.9 2 At the
same time, the solution I propose would have to be applied with some
judgment to prevent gaming of the system by late-night congressional
soliloquies and aggressive legislative histories that aim to unilaterally
and dishonestly expand the scope of what Congress considered.
There is incontrovertible evidence that Congress only gave
thought to declaratory judgments to fortify travel marriages, not to the
mill run of judgments considered by Professor Koppelman.
Accordingly, DOMA should not be interpreted as applying generally
to judgments, notwithstanding DOMA's admittedly broad language.

91. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338
(2000) ("[Clear statement rules] ensure that Congress decides certain contested
questions on its own."). The interpretive approach I advise is not a clear statement
rule, of course, for it does not look only to text of the statute, but also considers
legislative history. It is worth noting that the justification I provide does not run
afoul of the very interesting critique of clear statement rules recently put forward by
Professor John Manning. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the
Constitution, 110 COLUM L. REv. 399, 404 (2010).
92. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20
(1973) (limiting strict scrutiny for wealth-based discrimination to situations where
people "because of their impecunity ... were completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit") (emphasis added); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (distinguishing the case of Colegrove v. Green,
where the Court had found the claim to be nonjusticiable, on the ground that the
"appellants in Colegrove complained only of a dilution of the strength of their votes
as a result of legislative inaction over a course of many years. The petitioners here
.).
complain that affirmative legislative action deprives them of their votes . ...
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III. CONCLUSION
Though there are many plausible reasons why DOMA may be
unconstitutional, the Effects Clause is not one of them. The Court has
long understood that Congress has the power to determine the "extrastate effect" of state statutes, 93 and there is no good reason to believe
this power disappears if the Court is asked to make a determination
before Congress has prescribed a rule. The Court can play a valuable
role by ruling before Congress has acted, such as providing interim
rules and sustained analysis that can clarify the underlying conflicting
principles that properly inform a full faith and credit outcome.
However, Congress is better suited than the Court to ultimately
determine how the conflicting values underlying the principle of full
faith and credit should be reconciled.
Congress has many other institutional advantages over the courts.
It can better elicit information, including the policies behind various
state laws. Most importantly, Congress is structured so that it can
achieve coordinated solutions that bring about collective benefits:
Congress is composed of all affected states; provides prospective rules
that bind all states; can address multiple related issues simultaneously
thereby allowing negotiated compromises across related topics; and
can create new institutions that facilitate ongoing interstate
cooperation in the future.
In the absence of applicable federal statutory or case law, state
legislatures can address full faith and credit by means of uniform laws
and interstate compacts. State legislatures share the above mentioned
advantages that Congress has over the federal courts. However, state
legislatures are less suited than Congress to determine what full faith
and credit requires because they are less apt to look out for national
interests and are less capable of fashioning nation wide solutions.

93. See Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indust. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S.
493, 502 (1939).
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